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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FRANK R. HAFEN,

:

Petitioner and Appellant,
v.

:

Case No. 950265-CA

:

UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS and
FRED VAN DER VEUR,

:
Priority No. 3

Respondents and Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial
District Court entered March 17, 1995, granting respondents1
motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief
from a decision of the Utah State Board of Pardons ("Board") .
Because the petition does not involve a first degree felony, this
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1995).

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the district court correctly determine that

petitioner is not entitled to the additional due process
protections sought in his petition for his original parole grant
hearing?
Standard of Review!

On appeal from dismissal of a petition

for extraordinary relief, the appellate court "accord[s] no
deference to the conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal.

1

They are reviewed for correctness." Neel v. Holdenr 886 P.2d
1097, 1100 (Utah 1994).
2.

Did the district court correctly conclude that the

limited retroactivity of Neel v. Holdenr which extended due
process protections from original -parole grant hearings to
certain other Board proceedings, does not apply to pending claims
based on original parole grant hearings?
Standard of Review:

the non-deferential correctness

standard identified for the first issue applies to this issue as
well.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ANP RULES
Defendants do not believe that there are constitutional
provisions, statutes, or rules determinative of the issues for
decision.

STATEMENT OF TEE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Central Utah Correctional

Facility in Gunnison, Utah, filed a petition for extraordinary
relief on January 14, 1994, pursuant to Rule 65B(e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 2-25).

The petition sought relief

from respondents1 alleged violations of petitioner's due process
rights in his original parole grant hearing of September 1, 1993
fid,).

Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the Board (1) failed

to permit him to cross-examine adverse witnesses (R. 3-4, ^ 4a),
2

(2) failed to allow him to call witnesses in his own behalf (R. 4
at K 4a), (3) failed to permit him to review all information in
his file (R. 4 at 1 4b), and (4) improperly exceeded the
sentencing guidelines in determining the applicable time matrix
(R. 4-5 at 11 4c-e).
On February 7, 1994, respondents filed a motion to dismiss
(R. 38-39) and supporting memorandum (R. 40-44) on grounds of (1)
petitioner's failure to properly serve respondents and (2)
failure to pay required filing fees or, in the alternative, to
submit a statement of assets and liabilities for the court's
determination of the appropriate fee. The motion was denied by
order of April 11# 1994 (R. 56-58).
On September 12, 1994, petitioner filed an amended petition
repeating the claims of the original petition and adding a claim
based on an asserted right to assistance of counsel (R. 67-77).
A second motion to dismiss (R. 92-93) and supporting memorandum
(R. 94-113) were filed on December 15, 1994, under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.

This motion was granted by

order of March 17, 1995 (R. 116-119: Addendum A, attached).1

Petitioner stated in his brief that "[n]o addendum is
necessary" (Brief of Appellant at 14). However, under Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(11), the addendum to appellant's brief "shall
contain a copy of . . . (C) those parts of the record on appeal
that are of central importance to the determination of the
appeal, such as . . . findings of fact and conclusions of law . .
. ." Petitioner's challenge to the district court's legal
conclusions gives central importance to its Conclusions of Law
and Final Order, and defendants therefore include a copy as an
addendum to their brief for the Court's reference.

3

Petitioner filed his timely notice of appeal from the order on
April 14, 1995 (R. 120-21).

B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
Petitioner, an inmate confined to the Central Utah

Correctional Facility at Gunnison, Utah, has at all relevant
times been incarcerated on three terms of not less than one nor
more than fifteen years for sexual abuse of a child (R. 4, 1 4c;
8-10; 68, 1 1; 75-77).

On September 1, 1993, he came before

respondent Utah State Board of Pardons for his original parole
grant hearing and was granted a rehearing date of September, 1997
(R. 52)• It is undisputed that at the Board hearing, plaintiff
did not request counsel, ask for information from his file, seek
to confront or cross-examine witnesses, or attempt to present
additional evidence or information to the Board (R. 118).
On December 6, 1993, the Supreme Court of Utah issued its
opinion in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902
(Utah 1993), holding that state constitutional due process
requires the Board to give an inmate advance notice of the
information it will be considering in an original parole grant
hearing.

The court expressly limited the reach of its decision

to original parole grant hearings held on or after December 6,
1993, the date of the decision, and to claims based on due
process which were then pending in the district court or on
appeal.

Plaintiff's original parole grant hearing predated the

Labrum decision (R. 52), and his petition had not yet been filed
(R. 2 ) .
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On January 14, 1994, petitioner filed luy p e U l ion for
extraordinary relief, claiming due process violations by the
Boar^

• . ' •. •

grant hearing IK

2•2 51 , During the

pendency of the case, r h* supreme court decided Neel v^ Hidden, "
case involving alleged violations of due process by the Board in
post- i» vuL-dl i

[hiiuh.' qi.i i proceedings (R. 108-113

The Neel

court applied the due process protections granted

uabrum

original parole grant hearings to all Board hearings fixing
extending pdtuh

ri,iMM-

i/uini i- xtended

ne benefits

* its decision

to inmates with claims similar to Neel's then penc
state courts (R. 113). Petitioner's claim, though pending, was
dissimilar to Net11 ' ,'•• ," i ' '» it, ii raised rinp process issues only
with respect to his original parole grant hearing.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner argues that the Board unlawfully deprived him
va i: :i oi .s cii ne p r o c e s s r i g h t s .* \:')<* o r i g i n a l p a r o l e g r a n t h e a r i n g .
However, the undisputed

t show that

he failed to request the Board to provide any of the procedural
safeguards sought in his petition.

By failing to raise these

claims to the hutud, p»-l iL iuiiti waived t heiii I i purposes oi
further litigation, and the district court correctly dismissed
them.
Because his peti
Labrum decision, petitioner concedes that
c

L the
is *. „

^ cause

based solely on the procedural rights Labrum granted

with respect to original parole grant hearings.

However, he

argues that the pendency of the petition at the time of the Neel
decision permits reopening of claims based on his original parole
grant hearing because it is a Board hearing at which a parole
date is fixed or extended.

His argument fails to recognize that

his claim, based only on an original parole grant hearing and
governed by Labrum's general nonretroactivity provision, is not
similar to the post-revocation hearing claim adjudicated in Heal.
He points to no language in U££l that suggests an intent by the
court to override LabrumTs limited retrospective application in
original parole grant cases.

In fact, petitioner's expansive

interpretation of He^l would provide the very windfall benefit
that the Labrum court sought to avoid:

the reopening of cases in

which no actual prejudice has been suffered.

As the district

court correctly held, this result is warranted neither by law nor
by the undisputed facts of petitioner's case.

POINT I
BY FAILING TO BRING HIS DUE PROCESS CLAIMS BEFORE THE
BOARD, PETITIONER HAS WAIVED HIS OPPORTUNITY TO
LITIGATE THEM.
On appeal, petitioner argues that the district court
incorrectly dismissed his claims asserting various due process
rights, including the right to be represented by counsel, to
cross-examine witnesses, to call witnesses, and to present
evidence at his original parole grant hearing (aae. Brief of

6

Appellant at 3-4)

However, as the district court found,

Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies
available to him at the time of his hearing and did not
request the additional procedural safeguards that he
now seeks from the Court. Specifically, it is
undisputed that Petitioner failed to request counsel,
failed to ask for the information in his file, failed
to seek cross-examination or confrontation of
witnesses, failed to present additional evidence or
information at his hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner
has failed to demonstrate how the lack of these
additional procedures negatively affected the outcome
of the Board*s decision in his case. Finally,
petitioner has failed to identify any false information
relied upon by the Board in reaching its decision
even
though he has been provided a copy of the Board f s file.
R. 118. Nothing in petitioner's brief points to record
disput. i IN Lhej !t,; lacts

Because petitioner undisputedly failed to

bring his due process claims .-ic;

iias> waived them

for purposes : ! litigation.
3 uexu,

is axiomatic in our adversary

system that a party must raise proceeding or waive its right
proceed I rig s ,

• earlier
Litigate the issue in subsequent

BiiiiKerhofl y^ Schwendiman,

(Utah App. 1990)

Moreover,

7

- " P.2d 587, 589

|t|his pr IM.

the trial court setting, but applies equally
hearings."

Id,

limited to

administrative

Mv.s'.-nl this requirement, the administrative

forum would be deprived of. 11 :•« upf nn i mi i \ } m
errors

-

(m

i pet alleged

the proceedings, leading to unnecessary and protracted

litigai
.-r

As an administrative forum,
first opportunity •
•**"

i1, n

•» .

ven the

correct alleged errors in proceedings before
bjections before the Board, petitioner
7

has deprived the Board of its rightful opportunity to address
those objections and has waived his right to litigate them in
subsequent proceedings.

The district court therefore correctly

dismissed petitioner's claims, and he has given no grounds for
reversal of its decision.
POINT II
PETITIONER HAS SHOWN NEITHER RECORD FACTS NOR LEGAL
PRECEDENT SUPPORTING THE RIGHTS HE ASSERTS.
In his brief to this Court, petitioner specifically
addresses only his asserted rights to representation by counsel
and to confrontation of adverse witnesses in his original parole
grant hearing.

For neither of these claimed rights does he

provide support in record facts or binding precedent; in fact, he
fails to acknowledge this Court's favorable recognition of
contrary views.
A.

Right to Representation by Counsel
As to representation by counsel, petitioner states without

supporting argument or precedent that denial of counsel at his
original parole grant hearing "violates due process under Article
I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah" (Brief of Appellant at 9 ) .
In Neelf the supreme court rejected a requirement for
representation by counsel in parole hearings under article I,
section 7.

As the court explained,

the touchstone of due process in the context of parole
hearings is whether the proposed procedural due process
requirement substantially furthers the accuracy and
reliability of the Board's fact-finding process. In
light of this rationale and because Neel has failed to
show how the further participation of counsel at the

8

hearing would have affected the accuracy of the
information considered by the Board, we do not find
that Neel was ! denied due process by the Board's refusal
to allow Neel s counsel to address the Board.
Xfefil, 886 P.2d at 1103.
Like Neel, petitioner has failed to show how participation
of counsel would have affected the accuracy ''f the internal ion
the Board considered in his case. He argues only in general that
"[w]it

inmate has little chance of

effectively presenting his case to the BoartJ"" IMI U-I ui" ftpji^Hrmt
at .,/ . A counterargument was given credence by the Neel court:
We do note that the argument has been made that
attorney representation in parole grant hearings would
only inhibit the Board!s efforts to evaluate prisoners1
rehabilitative progress, and would, in the interests of
fairness, necessitate attorney representation of the
State's interests as well, ultimately resulting in
parole hearings encumbered by costly and time-consuming
trial procedures. We have no desire to turn these
hearings into adversarial or confrontational exercises
when there is not a clear showing of a need to do so.
Therefore, we view somewhat skeptically the suggestion
that attorneys should be permitted to address the Board
on their client's behalf in parole hearings.
Neelf 886 P.2d 1103, n.7 (citation omitted).
Having held against a state constitutional right to counsel,
the court further i IM-U l i

\\t>

lhiit-< ^ states Supreme Court has

rejected a federal constitutional right to counsel in r
revocations and reasoned that M[i]f the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee

parole revocation hearing, •._

certainly does not guarantee that right in an offender

. ..1

post-revocation parole grant hearing." IdL at 1104. Because the
Neel court found

st-revocation

9

hearings analogous to those implicated in original parole grant
hearings, the same logic applies to petitioner's case. Under
neither state nor federal constitutional analysis does petitioner
have a right to representation by counsel in an original parole
grant hearing.
Petitioner has offered nothing to rebut the supreme court's
well-placed skepticism regarding counsel participation in parole
grant hearings.

The absence of legal precedent or record facts

establishing a constitutional right to counsel, or showing that
participation by counsel is necessary to accurate and reliable
decisionmaking in original parole grant hearings, affords no
grounds for reversal of the district courtfs correct decision.
B.

Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses
Petitioner admits that even "the United States Supreme Court

has not held that the right to confrontation applies to
sentencing. . ." (Brief of Appellant at 11).

Nonetheless, he

suggests that the right of confrontation is fundamental to due
process before the Board.

He states without factual or legal

support that "[t]he right to confrontation should apply to any
witness who appears before the Board of [sic] who gives evidence"
(Brief of Appellant at 12).

He cites to State v. Lipskyf 608

P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980), to bolster his proposition that "where a
defendant challenges the accuracy of a report, his ability to
confront the witnesses becomes of paramount importance" (Brief of
Appellant at 12).

Lipsky cannot bear the weight with which

petitioner burdens it.
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Lipsky dealt with the issue of whether a criminal defendant
must be given access at the time of sentencing to a presentence
report prepared

- a Parole agency.

Holding that fundamental fairness mandates disclosure, i ii'
supreme court explicitly declined to find a right of
confrontation, stating that
the trial court may receive information concerning the
defendant in the form of a pre-sentence report without
the author of the report necessarily personally
appearing and testifying in open court. , . . If the
defendant thinks the report inaccurate, he should then
have the opportunity to bring such inaccuracies to the
court f s attention
Lips.^

JL * L

-L^-***

Rather than supporting the right

confrontation that petit. :

c~

iggests that other

means of rebutting perceived inaccuracies satisfy the imperatives
I furn-lament-H"I fairness and due process.
This Court acknowledged as

'« i

PLA!

>

" as the

requirements of due process are limited in sentencing
proceed .

.:e m

parole hearings at which an inmate's

predicted term of incarceration
1103.

A

crimin - ..

"

Nee'

f.za at

"ootnote to this statement sets out Lipsky and two other
-* * - n Ini cases to show that confrontation and cross-

examination are not required.

It

iilfiit jfu-'ii J^ipslty as "holding

that while defendant should be given opportunity to bring
inaccuraiiPS contained in presentence report

'o court's

attention, this may be done \

• -:

appearing and testifying in open court
3

State v. Sanwick r

11

*

:^^,

personally
886 P. 2d

713 P.2d 707 (Utah

1986), which denied cross-examination of victims whose statements
were contained in a presentence report, and State v. Rhodesf 818
P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991), "denying defendant's motion for
continuance of sentencing to obtain more favorable evidence by
cross-examination and holding that due process rights in
sentencing are satisfied by affording defendants opportunity to
examine and contest accuracy of factual statements contained in
reports before sentencing court." Neelr 886 P.2d 1103, n.6
(parentheses omitted).

Petitioner's brief does not discuss the

Court's favorable citation of these precedents in U££l or suggest
reasons for not applying them to the facts of his case.
Significantly, the cases cited in He^l deny a right to
confrontation in criminal sentencing proceedings involving new
deprivations of liberty; the contested Board proceedings, by
contrast, involve defendants whose liberty interests are
diminished by present incarceration.

Petitioner has given no

reason why his diminished interest warrants greater protection
than the courts have granted for criminal sentencing.

By leaving

unaddressed the Court's reference to these precedents, he has
provided no reasoned analysis for a different outcome in his case
and has pointed to no factual or legal grounds on which to
distinguish it. The lack of an articulated rationale gives no
basis for reversal of the district court's dismissal.
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POINT III
JSEEL'S LIMITED RETROACTIVITY DOES NOT APPLY TO CASES
SUCH AS PETITIONER'S WHICH RAISE CLAIMS RELATED ONLY TO
ORIGINAL PAROLE GRANT HEARINGS.
As petitioner correctly recognizes (see Brief of Appellant
at 13), he cannot base his claims on the procedural due process
protections granted in Labrum because his case does not fall
under its limited retroactivity provisions:

his original parole

grant hearing took place before Labrum was decided, and his
petition was not pending on the date of the decision. However,
he contends that the claims barred by Labrum are revived by Kael.
He bases his argument on the Jiesl court's statement that
today's decision applies only to those parole grant
hearings held on or after the date of this decision.
We extend the benefits of this decision to David Neel
and to any inmate who currently has a similar claim
pending in the district court or on appeal before this
court or the court of appeals.
Neelf 886 P.2d at 1105. The unexpressed rationale of
petitioner's argument appears to be that this language from the
Neel decision does not explicitly exclude original parole grant
hearings from the class of "parole grant hearings," and that the
pendency of his petition challenging an original parole grant
hearing when Neel was decided places him within ELe^l's
retroactivity for pending similar claims.
Petitioner's argument ignores the context of Neel.
an expansion, not a reconsideration, of Labrum.

K££l is

It did not

revisit the due process rights of inmates in the context of
original parole grant hearings.

It merely extended the rights

13

granted in Labrum to an analogous class of Board hearings-

As

the Neel court explained, "Neel argues that his post-revocation
parole grant hearing is analogous to the original parole grant
hearing in Labrum and# therefore, he was equally entitled to due
process protection.

We agree and conclude that the general

principles articulated in Labrum are applicable here as well."
886 P.2d at 1101.

Instead of limiting the expansion of Labrum

rights exclusively to the post-revocation setting, the court
chose to extend its holding to all hearings that are analogous to
original parole grant hearings in that "an inmate's release date
is fixed or extended."

Id.

To suggest that the court could

extend Labrum protections to a category of hearings which, being
governed by Labrum, already enjoys them is defiant of logic.
The Labrum court made clear its intention not to "force the
Board to rehear proceedings which did not offend due process and
resulted in entirely fair and accurate parole determinations."
Labrum, 870 P.2d at 913.

It expressed a concern that retroactive

application of its decision could "'occasion windfall benefits
for some defendants who have suffered no constitutional
deprivation.1" U L . at 912, siting Michigan v, Payne. 412 U.S.
47, 53 (1973).

Therefore, for collateral suits by inmates

lacking pending cases on Labrum issues or without post-Labrum
hearing dates, the court required an evidentiary showing of "some
evidence that the Board violated their rights to due process in
their original parole grant hearing" fLabrum, 902 P.2d at 913)
other than by denying the procedural safeguards Labrum granted.

14

As the district court found in the present case# petitioner has
made no such showing:

"he has not demonstrated with specificity

how the alleged violations harmed or prejudiced his particular
case" (R. 117) .
H££l adopted the Labrum retroactivity analysis, but did not
purport to apply it to cases already governed by Labrum.

It

limited retroactive application "to David Neel and to any inmate
who currently has a similar claim pending in the district court
or on appeal before this court or the court of appeals." Heel,
886 P.2d at 1105. Neel's claim, involving a Board hearing
analogous to an original parole grant hearing, is not similar to
petitionees claim, involving the original parole grant hearing
itself.

To find that Hasl opens a window for consideration of

petitioner's claims without the requisite evidentiary showing
under Labrum would be to provide the very windfall benefit the
Labrum court sought to avoid.

It is disingenuous to suggest that

the supreme court would intend such a result without saying so
explicitly.
Moreover, even if Neel afforded petitioner review of his
claims, it rejected the very due process protections that he
seeks on appeal.

It explicitly denied a constitutionally

mandated right to counsel and declined to require a procedural
safeguard where no prejudice had been shown. While Neel did not
seek a right of confrontation, the court, by favorably citing
Lipsky, Sanwick, and Rhodes (s££ Point IIB, supra), implicitly
ruled that confrontation in the setting of parole grant hearings
15

is not constitutionally required.

Even if petitioner were

"afforded all the rights contained" in the Neel decision (Brief
of Appellant at 14), his claims on appeal would not be answered.
Therefore, his invocation of Uael is unavailing.
The district court found, and petitioner does not dispute,
that "[p]etitioner only challenges the actions of the Board at
his original parole grant hearing.

He does not challenge the

actions of the Board during a rehearing or other subsequent
hearing" (R. 117). Based on these undisputed facts, the court
correctly concluded that Labrumf not E££l,

governs this case.

Petitioner's contorted interpretation of Neel would flood the
courts with litigation and "'work a fundamental injustice on the
Board, the judiciary, and the citizens of this state'" in
contradiction to the supreme court's stated policy.

K££l# 886

P.2d at 1105, citing Labrumr 870 P.2d at 913. Affirmance of the
district court's decision holding N££l retroactivity inapplicable
to petitioner's case is vital to maintaining fairness for both
inmates and the state.

CONCLUSION
By invoking H££l retroactivity to assert a Labrum claim,
petitioner seeks to open a Pandora's box of unwarranted
litigation.

Because he has neither made the key factual showing

of harm required by Labrum nor identified any key precedential
rulings to support the rights he asserts, his appeal must fail.
Moreover, his failure to present his claims to the Board in the

16

first instance waived their further litigation, and the district
court properly dismissed them.
For the reasons discussed above, defendants respectfully
request the Court to affirm the district court's dismissal of the
petition in this case.

REQUEST RE QRAIJ ARGUMENT MP/OR PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendants do not believe oral argument is necessary to the
disposition of the issues for decision, but desire to participate
if argument is ordered by the Court.

Defendants do not request a

published opinion in this case.

Dated this

(\4L
ll~^U^

day of August, 1995.

Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
. day of August, 1995,
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and accurate
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellees to the following:
David C. Anderson
505 East 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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Third Judicial District
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND FINAL ORDER

FRANK R. HAFEN,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 940900270 HC
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS,
and FRED VAN DER VEUR,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Respondents•

The above-entitled matter came before this Court on March 6,
1995, to consider Petitioner's amended petition for extraordinary
relief and Respondents' motion to dismiss. Petitioner was present
and represented by counsel David C. Anderson.

Respondents were

represented by Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General. The
Court having reviewed the documents and pleadings in this case and
having

heard

argument

by

the parties,

issues

the

following

Conclusions and Order:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On January 14, 1994, Petitioner filed the instant petition for
extraordinary relief claiming that the Utah Board of Pardons had
denied him of various alleged due process rights at his original
parole hearing held September 21, 1993.

Petitioner does not allege

that he requested the desired procedural protections from the Board
prior to this

litigation, and he has not demonstrated with

specificity how the alleged violations harmed or prejudiced his
particular case. Instead, Petitioner relies on Neel v. Holden. 886
P.2d 1015 (Utah 1994), to support his claims.
For the following reasons, the Court concludes Petitioner's
claims fall outside the protections given in both Neel and Labrum
v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993):
1.

Petitioner was heard by the Board prior to the Utah

Supreme Court's decision in Lab rum, and he did not file this action
until after that decision was rendered by the court.

Therefore,

the application of Lab rum to this case was specifically excluded by
the court in that decision.
2. Petitioner only challenges the actions of the Board at his
original parole grant hearing.

He does not challenge the actions

of the Board during a rehearing or other subsequent hearing.
Therefore, the Labrum decision applies to this case, not the
retroactivity provisions of Neel.
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With this in mind, the Court concludes that Petitioner must
support his claims with other arguments relating to the fairness of
the proceedings in his specific case. After reviewing Petitioner's
petition, the Court concludes that Petitioner did not exhaust
administrative remedies available to him at the time of his hearing
and did not request the additional procedural safeguards that he
now seeks from the Court.

Specifically, it is undisputed that

Petitioner failed to request counsel, failed to ask for the
information in his file, failed to seek cross-examination or
confrontation of witnesses, failed to present additional evidence
or information at his hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner has failed
to demonstrate

how

the

lack

of

these

additional

procedures

negatively affected the outcome of the Board's decision in his
case.

Finally, Petitioner has failed to identify any false

information relied upon by the Board in reaching its decision even
though he has been provided a copy of the Board's file.
Wherefore the Court concludes the Petitioner is not entitled
to the additional protections requested in the petition or those
specified in either Neel or Labrum.
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ORDER
BASED on the above, it is hereby ordered that Respondent's
Motion

to

Dismiss

is

granted

and

the

relief

requested

in

Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief is
denied.

This action is dismissed with prejudice.

-ft

DATED this

11 -""day of March, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

;

^ ^

LE KENNETH RI^TRUP
istrict judicial Judge

Approved as to form:

David C. Anderson
Attorney for Petitioner
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